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Abstract
I reconsider the eﬀect of capital income taxation on ﬁrm size and ﬁrm growth by embed-
ding the nucleus theory of ﬁrm development of Sinn (1991) into a framework of monopolistic
competition with new ﬁrm creation. In a turnover of ﬁrms, ﬁrm destruction is counter-
balanced by a permanent creation of new ﬁrms. Young ﬁrms are set up using an initial
capital infusion of new equity and undergo an intermediate stage of internal growth until
they ﬁnally reach a steady payout stage. The cross-section then contains ﬁrms of all ages
and development stages.
Dividend and capital gains tax have important eﬀects on initial ﬁrm size and growth but
also on the creation of new ﬁrms and thus on diversity in the economy. First, a diﬀerential
treatment of dividends and capital gains introduces a distortion in the allocation of capital
across ﬁrms. Second, dividend as well as capital gains tax are anticipated at the start-up
stage of ﬁrms. While leaving the ﬁrm speciﬁc capital stock unaﬀected, the capitalisation is
shown to depress ﬁrm creation and aggregate capital accumulation.
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11 Introduction
Capital income taxes receive prime attention in popular discussions on capital accumulation
and new ﬁrm creation. Politicians are highly interested in likely consequences of changes in the
dividend and capital gains taxes. Research in public ﬁnance however does not give univocal
support for some of the most often cited arguments. The discussion in the literature centers
around the so called old and new view of dividend taxation where the main diﬀerence lies in
the marginal source of investment funds. The derivation of the two diﬀerent views is typically
based on a partial, dynamic ﬁrm model. Auerbach (2002) summarises the basic setup.
The traditional old view argues that new equity is used as the marginal source of investment
ﬁnance. The investment calculus is based on an investor comparing an additional capital infusion
into the ﬁrm with an alternative investment at the market rate of return. If repayments to ﬁrm
investments are subject to the dividend tax, then the investor will request a higher pre-tax
yield from the ﬁrm increasing its cost of capital and thus depressing marginal investments.
If ﬁrms ﬁnance additional investments using new equity, then dividend and investment policy
are not directly connected. It is typically assumed that dividend policy is then used as a
signalling instrument where the eﬀectiveness of the instrument is determined by its costs, the
tax disadvantage of dividends versus capital gains. An increase in the dividend tax should
allow a smaller dividend to communicate the same signal. The old view predicts that dividend
payments decline with an increase in the dividend tax, see the version of the old view presented
by Poterba and Summers (1985).
The new view, sometimes referred to as the trapped equity view, in contrast uses retained
earnings as the source of marginal investments. According to this approach, investors decide
between receiving a taxable dividend payment today or reinvesting proﬁts which postpones the
taxable dividend payment into the future. Since dividend taxes are due anyway, they drop out of
the investment calculus and will have no eﬀect on marginal investment decisions. Tax changes,
however, aﬀect future payments to investors and are fully capitalised into ﬁrm values. According
to the new view, ﬁrms pay dividends if they have no proﬁtable investment opportunities at hand.
If the dividend tax changed permanently, then ﬁrms would still have the same excess cash ﬂow
to distribute so that dividends stay unaﬀected. Payouts are a residual.
In explaining aggregate behavior of an economy, both views have some intuitive applications
in mind. The old view’s focus on new equity ﬁnance is relevant for new ﬁrms with no free
cash ﬂow while the use of proﬁt retentions is plausible for large established ﬁrms with high free
cash ﬂow at hand. None of the two views seems completely convincing as a description of the
”representative” ﬁrm. Neither do ﬁrms regularly issue new equity, see Auerbach and Hassett
2(2003), so that the old view would be an adequate description of aggregate behavior, nor does
it seem plausible to focus on mature ﬁrms only and ignore new ﬁrms that depend on external
funds as done by the new view. In reality a mixture or combination of both streams seems
appropriate.
Despite the distinct diﬀerences of the two views, testing for the two views of dividend taxation
has turned out to be diﬃcult. The most often cited empirical estimation supporting the old
view goes back to Poterba and Summers (1985). Given that old and new view have opposing
predictions related to the shadow price of capital q, Poterba and Summers (1985) estimate an
aggregate measure of q and ﬁnd results in favour of the old view. In general however, estimations
based on the q theory of ﬁrm investment have proven to be hard to estimate and have only
recently provided meaningful results, see Hassett and Hubbard (2002). The results can thus be
critisized for technical reasons. In addition, Auerbach and Hassett (2003) emphasise that the
estimation of Poterba and Summers (1985) would only contradict the tax capitalisation and not
the cost of capital prediction of the new view. Auerbach and Hassett (2003) then try to test
the new view’s neutrality result more closely by looking at the relationship between dividend
payments and new investments. They ﬁnd that, in line with the new views predictions, mature
ﬁrms decrease dividend payments in response to proﬁtable investment opportunities which makes
retentions the marginal source of investment funds. Their result applies mostly to mature ﬁrms,
while in general there seems to be considerable heterogeneity concerning the marginal source
of investments. Auerbach and Hassett (2003) conclude that ”[t]he discretness of the regimes is
really just a useful simpliﬁcation.” Old and new view seem to be relevant for a subsample of
ﬁrms.
Sinn (1991) provides an important addition to the theoretical literature which can be inter-
preted in line with these recent empirical ﬁndings. His model descibes a tax induced life-cycle
of ﬁrm evolution. Initially, a new ﬁrm is set up using new equity and thus follows the old view
of dividend taxation. The ﬁrm then starts to grow to a mature state by retaining all internal
funds. The mature state is achieved when retaining additional funds is no longer proﬁtable. In
the mature state, the ﬁrm thus follows the new view. The ﬁrm only starts to pay dividends once
it has ﬁnished growing and there are no proﬁtable investment opportunities at hand. Defending
the new view, Sinn (1991, p. 295) argues that the last stage seems to describe real world best
but agrees that new ﬁrms are better described using the ﬁrst phase with new equity as the
marginal source of ﬁnance.
Empirical work has provided some insights into new ﬁrm creation and capital income tax-
ation. Rosen (2002) summarises the literature and emphasises that taxation is an important
3determinant of ﬁrm creation and ﬁrm growth. While the old view with its focus on new equity
ﬁnance can be interpreted as looking exactly at newly founded ﬁrms, the new view predicts
no real eﬀect of dividend taxation on marginal investment decisions but a capitalization of tax
payments in ﬁrm values. However, taxation has consequences for new ﬁrm creation if future
tax payments are anticipated by new entrepreneurs faced with the discrete decision of starting
a venture. Gompers and Lerner (1998) provide additional support for the inﬂuence of taxes on
ﬁrm creation. They look at the market for venture capital, typically used at the creation stage
of ﬁrms, and ﬁnd that demand for venture capital is highly sensitive to changes in the capital
gains tax. Taken together, we suppose that an important burden of dividend and capital income
taxes falls on new ﬁrm creation and incorporating new ﬁrm creation seems to add a very relevant
margin to the discussion on the real eﬀects of dividend and capital gains taxation.
Given the insights of partial equilibrium models as well as anecdotical evidence, we expect
that capital income taxation will inﬂuence the growth of established ﬁrms as well as the creation
of new ﬁrms. Consequently, an integrated approach on the economic eﬀects of dividend and
capital gains taxation must not stop with the single ﬁrm case but rather consider the problem
in a macroeconomic environment with ﬁrm heterogeneity and new ﬁrm creation. Our approach
is thus to embed the dynamic ﬁrm model of Sinn (1991) into a turnover model of new ﬁrm
creation and destruction. Given the permanent creation of new ﬁrms, the cross section will
contain ﬁrms of all development stages and show a heterogeneity of ﬁrms just as described in
the recent empirical literature. This will allow us to capture the diﬀerent implications that
dividend and capital gains tax might have on young and mature ﬁrms. While repeating result
for single ﬁrm case, this approach will allow the calculation of aggregate measures and their
movement in response to changes in tax parameters.
Coexistence of new and mature ﬁrms in the presence of dividend and capital gains taxes
poses some systematical problems. If new and mature ﬁrms would produce the same good, then
the competitive market price would reﬂect the low cost of capital of mature ﬁrms when using
proﬁt retentions. New ﬁrms with external equity could only produce at higher tax adjusted
opportunity costs of capital and would therefore possibly not be founded at all, see Judd and
Petersen (1986). New ﬁrms thus have to have some sort of advantage in order to justify their
creation. On the other side, we want mature ﬁrms to approach some ﬁnite ﬁrm size, a feature
that is also not present in a standard neoclassical model. Both problems are solved by a revenue
function with declining returns as in Sinn (1991). While he considers a production function
with decreasing returns to scale and a competitive output market, the same revenue function
follows from a downward sloping demand curve and a production function with constant rates of
4return.1 As stressed by McGee (1998), the market power approach of a monopolistic competition
model captures typical arguments raised when discussing new ﬁrm creation. New ﬁrms are not
perfect competititors for established ﬁrms but concentrate on new, innovative products.
This paper expands the basic setup of monopolistic competition by describing a single ﬁrm
along the lines of the nucleus theory of ﬁrm evolvement. A ﬁrm is set up at a ﬁxed cost and is
endowed with an initial capital infusion using new equity. Because of its monopolistic power,
the ﬁrm then starts generating proﬁts which are, at ﬁrst, reinvested to increase its capital stock.
If the ﬁrm ﬁnally reaches a mature status, it starts paying out all additional proﬁts as dividends.
The growth period of individual ﬁrms is solely a tax eﬀect and hence greatly sensitive to tax
rates. Firm destruction happens due to adverse shocks with an exogenous hazard rate. In
equilibrium, the turnover of ﬁrms guaranties a stable distribution of ﬁrms of all development
stages, see Caves (1998).
The paper is new in its combination of the typical dynamic ﬁrm model used to analyse
capital income taxation with a macroeconomic model of monopolistic competition. The concept
of monopolistic competition has however been used intensively to analyse related problems.
Keuschnigg (2001) considers the trade-oﬀ between bigger and smaller production units using a
vintage model of ﬁrm investment. In his model there are trade-oﬀs between the size and the
growth rate of ﬁrms. Recently, Klette and Kortum (2002) considered the innovation process
of ﬁrms and have combined a model of monopolistic competition with ﬁrm level evidence on
R&D and the size of ﬁrms. Firm heterogeneity is obtained by a variable number of goods that
a ﬁrm produces while the production capacity for each good, which is heterogeneous in our
setup, is ﬁxed in their work. Much of the endogenous growth literature following Romer (1990)
is based on the microeconomics of monopolistic competition. There exists a variety of papers
that consider taxation of labour, physical and human income in this growth context. None of
these models considers capital income taxation in greater detail. Judd (1997) is most similar
to our model. It is diﬀerent from the paper here as it does not consider new ﬁrm creation and
does not distinguish between dividend and capital gains taxation. His focus lies on the optimal
trade-oﬀ between capital and labour taxation while we are interested in dividend versus capital
gains taxation.
The paper proceeds as follows. The subsequent section establishes the equilibrium outcome
by introducing the production setup with ﬁnal and intermediate goods producers as well as con-
sumers together with their dynamic behavior and then calculates macroeconomic aggregates.
1Consider a linear homogenous production function with a demand function of constant elastictiy
1
1−ε, the
revenue function can be written as R = p · K = (const. · K
1−ε)K = const. · K
ε, identical to a decreasing returns
to scale technology with exogenous pricing. See McGee (1998, p. 659).
5The following part then focuses on the eﬀects of the capital gains and dividend tax. We discuss
changes in individual ﬁrm behavior and macroeconomic aggregates as well as empirical impli-
cations of the model and optimal capital income taxation. The ﬁnal section summarizes our
results.
2 The Model
2.1 Final good producers
We consider a two stage production technology following Ethier (1982) which is based on the
formulation of monopolistic competition by Spence (1976) and Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). Pro-
duction Yi of a ﬁnal good producer i makes use of labour Li and a diversiﬁed intermediate
capital good xij produced by diﬀerent ﬁrms j = 1,..,N. The production function is such that
diﬀerent capital goods are imperfect substitutes with a substitution elasticity of 1
1−ε between










We will assume α < ε for decreasing returns to scale in both productive factors, capital and
diversity of intermediate goods.2 The price of the ﬁnal output good is taken as a numeraire.
Final good producers are faced with a perfectly competitive market which eliminates their
proﬁts. Being price-takers in the markets for intermediate goods they minimize production
costs by choosing an optimal allocation between diﬀerent intermediate goods.




















xij di and L =
R
Lidi = 1. Now using the deﬁnition of Yi and
the constant labor-output-ratio, we can add up over all Li and ﬁnd the demand for intermediate
2 Notice that a version of the model with symmetric inputs of intermediate goods can be written as Y =
N
α
ε −α · (Nx)
α. The assumption of α < ε is true for a typical calibration of the model and rules out endogenous











The ﬁnal output good serves as consumption as well as input good for setting up the capital
stock of intermediate good producing ﬁrms. We will come back to the usage of ﬁnal goods at a
later stage. Because of the competitive nature of the ﬁnal good producing industry, ﬁrms make
zero proﬁts and also have zero ﬁrm values so that neither dividend nor capital gains taxes are
relevant. We can now turn to the intermediate goods producing ﬁrms which will be at the centre
of the analysis.
2.2 Intermediate goods producing ﬁrms
Each diversiﬁed good is produced by a single, proﬁt maximising ﬁrm. An investor expects to
receive the market rate of return from his investments in such a ﬁrm. Return to ﬁrm value Vj(t)
can be made using dividends Dj(t) (upon which a dividend tax τ is levied) or capital gains
˙ Vj(t) − V Nj(t) (who pay a capital gains tax c). Capital gains are changes in ﬁrm value ˙ Vj(t)
that are not due to new equity issues V Nj(t). We will assume that ﬁrm destruction takes place
with an exogenous hazard rate of δ. Anticipating the ﬁnal outcome, we take the real rate of
return r as constant over time. The capital market equilibrium then requests:
(r + δ)Vj(t) = (1 − τ)Dj(t) + (1 − c)
h
˙ Vj(t) − V Nj(t)
i
(4)
The capital gains tax rate c is an eﬀective tax rate. As the tax is due only when capital gains
are realized, it allows for tax deferral as well as evasion strategies. Both will tend to decrease the
eﬀective tax burden below the statutory rate. In applied studies it is therefore common practise
to use half of the statutory rate as an approximation for the eﬀective one. We assume that ﬁrm
destruction is not eligible for (negative) capital gains taxes that is, investors are assumed not to
have an oﬀsetting opportunity. We can then see that the market rate of return is augmented by

















Firm value is a sum of future net after taxes payouts to investors 1−τ
1−cDj(s) − V Nj(s) dis-
counted using the factor r+δ
1−c. Firms are assumed to operate at a linear production function
7that uses capital Kj (s) as the only input good where the capital stock evolves according to the
familiar law of motion
˙ Kj (s) = Ij (s) (6)
where Ij (s) are new investments made out of the ﬁnal good. Production possibilities are limited
by the capital stock xj(s) ≤ Kj(s). There are no ﬁxed or variable costs implying that ﬁrm proﬁts
equal revenues πj(s) = pj(s) · xj(s). The ﬁrm is then faced with a cash ﬂow constraint
pj (s)xj (s) + V Nj(s) = Dj(s) + Ij (s). (7)
Inﬂows are proﬁts and new equity and outﬂows are dividends and new investment. As a mo-
nopolist the ﬁrm can set prices to maximise its proﬁt using the demand function (3). Corporate
ﬁnancial policy is constrained by the two standard assumptions that dividends and new equity
are non-negative. The general setup of a ﬁrm is not diﬀerent from well known results, so that
we can postpone the formal solution to the appendix and state only the most important results
here.
Firms undergo an evolution beginning with their birth followed by a growth stage to a mature
status. The three cases describe the nucleus theory as in Sinn (1991):3
1. Start-up Firm
This is only a momentary state of setting up the ﬁrm. New equity is the marginal source
of investments and the ﬁrm thus reﬂects the ”old“ view of dividend taxation so that
the shadow price of capital equals one q (0) = 1. Because of the cash ﬂow and capital
accumulation condition we ﬁnd I (0) = V N(0) = K (0). The initial capital stock will be
set to a fraction κ(τ,c,ε) of the ﬁnal one.
K (0) = κ(τ,c,ε)K (T) (8)
The choice of κ will reﬂect an optimal trade-oﬀ between tax considerations and the timely
usage of the monopoly power. Based on the diﬀerential treatment of dividends versus
capital gains, ﬁrms will prefer to retain proﬁts and grow internally. The possibility to
generate supernatural proﬁts due to the monopoly power on the other side, asks for a high
capital stock right from the start and an early start of the ﬁnal payout phase. An in depth
analysis is postponed to the general section on taxation.
3From now on, we will count time beginning from the start of the ﬁrm. It reaches the steady state after time
T. Values indexed T are then representative for the steady state of a mature ﬁrm. By the symmetry of ﬁrms of
the same age we will also drop the index j.
82. Growing Firm
Given its initial capital stock, the ﬁrm starts generating proﬁts and retaining them in order
to built up the remaining share 1 − κ(τ,c,ε) of its capital stock. Marginal source of new
investments are now retained earnings. There are no payouts so that all free cash ﬂow is
invested in increasing the capital stock.







This is in an intermediate growth stage during which the capital stock increases perma-















The length of the growth period depends again on the initial share of the capital stock











The growth period depends on on the ﬁnancial share of retentions κ in a nonlinear way
reﬂecting the accelerating growth of ﬁrms following the dynamic monopolistic price setting.
3. Mature Firm
Once the ﬁnal capital stock is reached, the ﬁrm ﬁnds itself in a steady payout state with
no new investments I (T) = 0 (remember that we assumed no depreciation of capital at
the ﬁrm level, only the ﬁrm as a whole can decease). The ﬁrm has retained proﬁts until
the point when this was no longer proﬁtable. Now, ﬁrm proﬁts will be fully paid out
to investors as dividends. The mature status thus follows the ”new“ view so that the
shadow price of capital reﬂects the diﬀerential between dividend and capital gains tax
rates q (T) = 1−τ
1−c.
The ﬁrm will use a typical markup price-setting rule over the marginal costs using its
monopolistic power. Marginal costs related to an increase in the capital stock are given



































9Figure 1 gives the graphical intuition of ﬁrm growth. Capital stock K (t) and shadow price
q (t) follow the diﬀerential equations (A.6a) and (A.6b) and thereby provide a smooth transition
between the start phase and the mature state. While the start phase is only valid momentarily,
the ﬁnal state is valid until the ﬁrm depreciates.
1 - t
1 - c
Figure 1: Growth path of a single ﬁrm
Having determined ﬁrm behavior, we can now calculate initial ﬁrm value using (5). We have
already seen that there is a capital infusion V N(0) at the beginning of the ﬁrm life-cycle followed
by a period of length T with internal growth and neither new equity nor dividend payments
until the ﬁrm reaches a steady payout phase with dividends D(T). We can then give two useful
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− V N(0) (14)
Firm value equals the present value of a discounted stream of dividend payments starting
after the growth period.
2.3 Equilibrium
We will assume that developing a new product causes a ﬁxed cost of a. These costs refer to a
nonproductive start-up investment made out of the ﬁnal good. Free entry of new intermediate
10goods producing ﬁrms will ultimately eliminate excess proﬁts in the sector. In general, setting
up a new ﬁrm is proﬁtable if V (0) ≥ a and ﬁrm proﬁts V (0) are decreasing in the ﬁrm variety
N. If we would have V (0) > a so that there are too few ﬁrms then ﬁrm creation NN would
take place until proﬁts are ﬁnally eliminated.
Firms of all age depreciate at a constant rate of δ. Once a ﬁrm dies, its capital stock as well
as the ﬁxed costs are lost. In an aggregated version, a fraction δ of all ﬁrms and thus of overall
capital will depreciate and resemble economic depreciation. If the economy would start with a
ﬁrm number that is too high so that V (0) < a, then no new ﬁrm creation would take place and
depreciation of ﬁrms would reduce ﬁrm diversity. The only stable long-run equilibrium then is
characterised by the equilibrium conditions
V (0) = a (15)
˙ N = NN − δN = 0 (16)
New ﬁrm creation will balance depreciation of ﬁrms so that the total number of ﬁrms stays
constant. By the constant rate of new ﬁrm creation NN = δN, we also see that there will be a
stable distribution of ﬁrms over their life-cycle. Given the hazard rate of ﬁrm depreciation, the
unconditional survival probability of a single ﬁrm declines exponentially with its age, that is,
after time t only a fraction of exp(−δt) from an intial ﬁrm creation of δN is still alive. By the end
of the growth phase T all ﬁrms reach their steady mature state. Given that growing ﬁrms form
a fraction
R T
0 δN exp(−δt)dt = N (1 − exp(−δT)), mature ﬁrms will amount to N exp(−δT).
Consumer are assumed to maximize a standard intertemporal utility function given an in-







˙ A = r · A + w · L − C (18)
All taxes are reimbursed to consumers so that they do not appear in this expression.
We can now calculate macroeconomic aggregates. Combining (14) and (15) with D(T) =
p(T) · K(T) and V N(0) = κ · K(T) determines the optimal size of mature ﬁrms K(T) as a
function of exogenous parameters alone. We can then calculate overall production by solving


































δN exp(−δt)K(t) + δN exp(−δT)K(T). (22)
Taking a cash-ﬂow perspective, consumers receive dividend payments from mature ﬁrms and
invest funds in new ﬁrm creation. Taxes are reimbursed and we can evaluate capital income of
consumers as:
r · A = δN (1 − exp(−δT))D(T) − δN(a + K(0)) = αY − δ · K − δNa (23)
Because of decreasing returns in the sum of the variable production factors diversity and
capital, the economy ultimately approaches a steady state without growth. In the long-run
equilibrium, the rate of return equals the consumers time preference r = ρ implying ˙ A = 0 und
we determine usage of the ﬁnal good from (18) and (23) as
Y = C + δ(K + Na) (24)
In order to emphasize the symmetry of this model with a typical neoclassical model, we can
rearrange equation (21) to:
Y = Nα(
1




0 δ exp(−δt)K(t)εdt + exp(−δT)K(T)ε
hR T
0 δ exp(−δt)K(t)dt + exp(−δT)K(T)
iε
The variable Γ measures a tax induced distortion in capital allocation across ﬁrms. For now
it seems suﬃcient to notice that without taxation, so that κ = 1 and T = 0, we have Γ = 1 and
Y = Nα(
1
ε−1)KαL1−α so that production is identical to a typical textbook case. Tax parameter
aﬀect aggregate production at various margins. The next sections will then analyse this problem
step by step and we will come back to the allocation of capital across ﬁrms measured by Γ at a
later stage.
123 Taxation
We will now turn to an analysis of taxation in the framework developed above. We have already
argued that mature ﬁrms ﬁnance additional marginal investments using retained earnings. Firm
behavior should then follow the new view of dividend taxation saying that the dividend tax has
no eﬀect on marginal investment decisions but that it will change the valuation of the capital
stock, see the shadow price q (T) = 1−τ
1−c. Changes in the tax parameter will then be capitalised
into ﬁrm values. The new view predicts that taxing dividends has no allocative eﬀects and only
changes the distribution of wealth as the tax is paid by ﬁrm owners through a reduction in ﬁrm
value. While there is no direct eﬀect of the dividend tax, the capital gains tax eﬀects the capital
stock by changing the ﬁrm’s discount factor, see (12). In the general equilibrium approach used
in this model, eﬀects of dividend and capital gains tax turn out to be quite diﬀerent from the
stylized view just presented.
The analysis is structured as follows: We will ﬁrst show how tax capitalisation depresses ﬁrm
creation in general equilibrium and depresses aggregate capital accumulation and production.
We then move on to the distorting impact of a diﬀerential taxation of capital gains and dividends
which is shown to disturb the allocation of capital across ﬁrms. Having laid out the consequences
of capital income taxes in the general equilibrium, we will compare our results with predictions
of old and new view of dividend taxation. We conclude the analysis with a brief consideration
of optimal taxation.
3.1 Tax capitalisation and new ﬁrm creation
Both taxes are felt at the founding stage of the ﬁrm, see (14). Increasing the dividend tax
reduces net payments to investors. A higher capital gains tax increases the discount rate r+δ
1−c
and reduces ﬁrm value as well. Without any endogenous changes in the model, initial ﬁrm value
will thus fall below the opportunity costs of ﬁrm creation a. This is a common argument when
considering the impact of capital income taxation on new ﬁrm creation. Typically, the impact
of the capital gains tax is then emphasized by arguing that is due much earlier in the life cycle
of a ﬁrm and should thus be more harmful.
We expect two types of endogenous reaction to a change in tax parameters. First, ﬁrms might
adjust their corporate ﬁnancial policy in order to cope with changed tax incentives. Second, a
decline in ﬁrm values will depress aggregate ﬁrm creation and initiate macroeconomic changes.
We will ﬁrst concentrate the analysis on the pure capitalisation eﬀect of capital income taxes and
thus abstract from endogenous reactions in the ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial policy. Arguably such a change
13in corporate ﬁnance will only be able to weaken but not to remove the eﬀect of capitalisation.
By equating the tax parameter τ = c, we eliminate the growth process completely so that κ = 1
and T = 0. Firms are thus endowed with their mature capital stock right from the start.
Evaluating (19) at κ = 1, we ﬁnd K(0) = K(T) = a· ε
1−ε so that single ﬁrm size is independent
of the level of taxes. However, observing (20) we see that total production Y declines in the level
of taxes τ = c and (21) solved for the ﬁrm number N = Y
ε
α
L1−αK(T)ε proves that the tax burden
falls on the creation of new ﬁrms and depresses diversity in the economy. By the deﬁnition of
the aggregate capital stock K = N · K(T), capital usage of the economy falls as well.
An increase in the tax parameter depresses net payments to investors, initial ﬁrm values
fall and new ﬁrm creation ceases. As ﬁrm depreciation reduces capital and diversity and thus
aggregate production of the economy, the monopolistic power of an individual ﬁrm increases
and expected proﬁts from new ﬁrm creation increase. Firm creation will ﬁnally restart, however
at a lower level of production, diversity and aggregate capital usage.
3.2 Diﬀerential taxation and the allocation of capital across ﬁrms
3.2.1 Firm ﬁnancial behavior
As the model of individual ﬁrms is based on the nucleus theory of Sinn (1991), individual
ﬁrm behavior will share many of his results.4 Since we succeeded in solving out the diﬀerence
equations related to single ﬁrm growth, see the appendix, we are able to provide analytical
derivatives of the ﬁrm’s endogenous behavior.
Internal versus external ﬁnance We have already found that the capital stock will initially
be set to a fraction κ(τ,c,ε) of the ﬁnal capital stock using new equity. The remaining part
1 − κ(τ,c,ε) will then be ﬁnanced using internal capital accumulation. This partition will play
an important part in the following analysis. From the viewpoint of a single ﬁrm, it represents the
optimal trade oﬀ between usage of monopolistic power and tax incentives. In an aggregate view
and corrected for ﬁrm depreciation during the growth phase, it will describe the ﬁnancing shares
of the total capital stock as well asgross investments out of new equity and proﬁt retentions. It
is thus interesting to start the analysis by determining the behavior of κ in response to changes
in the tax variables.
4Weichenrieder (1995) provides several simulations of the nucleus model. McGee (1998) extends the basic
setup by allowing for debt ﬁnance and agency costs. Many remarks in his paper relate to general equilibrium
eﬀects which can however not be made rigorous in his partial equilibrium setup.
14When deciding upon the optimal ﬁnancial mix, ﬁrms are faced with a trade-oﬀ to explore
the monopoly power as soon as possible on the one side, and using the lightly taxed capital
gains as a possibility to ﬁnance the building up of the capital stock on the other side. Changing
the tax parameter will change the tax incentives for capital gains versus dividends and will
shift the optimal mix of ﬁnancial instruments. Increasing the dividend tax increases the relative
advantage of capital gains while increasing the capital gains tax decreases the tax wedge. The
formal results are thus easily anticipated. Using a total diﬀerential in the deﬁnition of κ, see


















1 − κ1−ε > 0 (27)
The dividend tax induces the ﬁrm to increase proﬁt retention while the capital gains tax
shifts the ﬁnancial mix towards the use of external new equity.
Growth period The growth period measures the time of retaining proﬁts and thus behaves
very much in line with the importance of internal ﬁnance 1−κ, see also (10). The growth period







































A decrease in market power, that is a higher value of ε, will increase the growth period. We
can check the intuition using both limiting cases. Consider ﬁrst the competitive case ε −→ 1
where diﬀerent intermediate goods are substitutes. Existing mature ﬁrms can then use lightly
taxed internal funds to increase their capacity and compete with new ﬁrms that would have to use
new equity. New ﬁrms can only use a minimal external capital infusion and then have to rely on
internal funds to increase their capital stock. From an investor perspective, he will prefer lightly
taxed capital gains and not be eager to use the rather limited potential of monopoly power.
Moving to the opposite case of ε −→ 0 we ﬁnd that given the enormous proﬁt opportunity due
to their monopolistic market power, ﬁrms will prefer not to grow at all in order to use market
power as soon as possible and start the pay out phase immediately.
153.2.2 Size of mature ﬁrms
Although mature ﬁrms follow the new view by using retentions as their marginal source of
ﬁnance, a diﬀerential treatment of dividends and capital gains has an eﬀect on the ﬁnal capital
stock, see (19). This turns out to be a general equilibrium eﬀect which shifts the demand
function of ﬁrms while leaving its elasticity unchanged. Enfant ﬁrms in their growth phase will
demand a higher price for their intermediate goods given a limit pricing strategy, see (A.3). This
implies that ﬁnal good producers will substitute some higher priced products with lower priced
ones made by mature ﬁrms.5 Established ﬁrms thus feel increased demand for their products
and choose to grow to a bigger size by increasing their ﬁnal capital stock K(T). The small size
of enfant ﬁrms has a counterbalancing eﬀect of increasing mature ﬁrm size.





















Notice that the eﬀect is only a result of the diﬀerential treatment of dividends and capital
gains. A joint variation of both tax parameters which keeps the growth phase constant will have
no eﬀect on mature ﬁrm size. If both tax parameters are equally high and potentially non-zero
so that κ = 1 and T = 0, then the mature capital stock is identical to the no-tax case.
3.2.3 The size distribution of ﬁrms
By the constant rate of new ﬁrm creation in equilibrium, the steady state will experience a stable
distribution of ﬁrms of all development stages. Thus, the capital stock of ﬁrms ranges from the
initial κ · K(T) for start-ups to a ﬁnal K(T) for mature ﬁrms. The heterogeneity of ﬁrm size is
solely a tax eﬀect and disappears if tax rates are equated.
Figure 2 is a graphical interpretation of the total capital stock K =
R N
0 Kj dj, see (22) and
provides a useful, graphical interpretation of the steady state distribution of ﬁrms. The ﬁgure
is based on a stylized calibration of the model. This involves a capital share of production of
α = .3, a coeﬃcient for diversity of ε = 10
11 implying a typical price markup in the mature state
of 10%, an interest rate of ρ = r = .05 and depreciation of δ = .1. The ﬁxed costs of setting
up a ﬁrm are only a scale parameter and are set to a = .01. The capital gains tax is set to
5Notice that mature prices are unaﬀected by an increase in the dividend tax.
16c = 10.0% and simulated dividend taxes are τ ∈ 20.0%,22.5%,25.0%. The ﬁgure interpretes the
ﬁrm number as a continuous variable. Firms are sorted by ﬁrm age where new ﬁrms are added
on the right and ﬁrm size can be read from the vertical axis. Mature ﬁrms on the left opperate
at the mature capital stock, growing ﬁrms of all growth stages join to the right and new ﬁrms
are added on the very right.
Figure 2: Heterogeneity of ﬁrm size (Simulated)
We can now see the distortion in capital allocation described above. Notice ﬁrst that the
higher the dividend tax, and thus the higher the diﬀerential treatment of dividends and capital
gains, the higher the heterogeneity of ﬁrm size. Firm creation takes place at a lower initial
capital stock on the very right and ﬁrms grow to a higher mature capital stock, see mature ﬁrms
on the left. While the average lifetime of a ﬁrm 1
δ stays constant, the growth period increases
with the diﬀerential taxation, see (28) and (29). Thus, an increasing part of ﬁrms will operate
at a capital stock below K(T). Finally, we see that the ﬁrm number declines with the dividend
tax representing the tax capitalisation eﬀect discussed before.
3.2.4 A macroeconomic perspective
The heterogeneity of ﬁrm size translates into the aggregate production function. Moving on








0 δ exp(−δt)K(t)εdt + exp(−δT)K(T)ε
hR T
0 δ exp(−δt)K(t)dt + exp(−δT)K(T)
iε
The term Γ takes account of the ﬁrm heterogeneity with respect to the size of the capital stock
and formalizes the distortion in capital allocation across ﬁrms. Notice the similarities between
nominator and denominator. Especially, terms
R T
0 δ exp(−δt)dt and exp(−δT) are weights and
add up to 1. A fraction of exp(−δT) already works at the full capital stock, the remaining
ﬁrms opperate at a fraction between κ and 1 of the ﬁnal capital stock. The denominator of
Γε thus calculates the average capital stock and then applies the concave power function. The
nominator on the other hand considers the actual, heterogeneous distribution of capital and
applies the power function on every instance separately. By Jensen’s inequality we can thus
conclude Γε ≤ 1. Obviously, the impact of the distortion disappears if both taxes are identical
implying κ = 1 and T = 0. It will also disappear if ε → 1 so that there are no gains from
diversity.
It is well known from inital work of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) that all production units in a
monopolistic competition framework should produce the same amount of intermediate goods.
By the symmetry of products, all producers should be faced the same size decision and thus
produce the same amount of intermediate goods. Here, all products are identical but as the
decision structure of producers is distorted by the tax induced growth period of ﬁrms, the equal
outcome is not achieved. In order to escape the capital income tax, ﬁrms move away from
the eﬃcient capital structure and thus depress aggregate production. Taking a social planner’s
viewpoint, a redistribution of capital from mature to enfant ﬁrms such that all ﬁrms opperate
at the average size would increase overall production.
Coming back to our tax parameter, we have already shown that both of them will depress
capital accumulation by their capitalization into ﬁrm values and the following decline in ﬁrm
creation. We have now analysed a diﬀerent eﬀect based on the diﬀerential treatment of dividends
and capital gains and related to the eﬃciency of capital allocation. The dividend tax increases
the growth phase of individual ﬁrms and will then increase the distortion. The capital gains tax
on the other hand reduces the growth phase and improves the eﬃciency of allocation.
183.3 Aggregate production
We will now turn to the inﬂuence of tax parameters on aggregate production. Given the ar-
guments developed before, the impact of the dividend tax is clearly anticipated: The tax is
capitalised into ﬁrm values and thus felt at the start-up phase of a ﬁrm where it distorts ﬁrm
creation and thus puts an additional burden on capital accumulation. Second, it increases the
distortion in the allocation of capital by inducing ﬁrms to start at a lower capital stock, grow
longer and approach a higher ﬁnal capital stock. Both eﬀects tend to depress overall production.
The capital gains tax on the other side has two opposing predictions. First, it increases the tax
burden on new ﬁrm creation which decreases capital accumulation and production. Second,
it reduces the distortion in capital allocation which will increase the eﬃciency of production.
However, it would be quite surprising to ﬁnd that a tax on capital increases the capital stock
or total production, so that we suppose that the ﬁrst eﬀect should dominate. This can be made




















1 − εκ1−ε < 0 (34)
Eﬃciency gains induced by an increase in the eﬃciency of capital allocation by a higher
capital gains tax turn out to be only of secondary importance.
3.4 A discussion in the light of the existing literature
The source of marginal investment funds Capital accumulation is ﬁnanced by a mixture
of new equity and retained earnings reﬂecting initial start-up infusion and the following internal
growth. While marginal investments of most ﬁrms are ﬁnanced using proﬁt retentions, the
crucial start-up investments of new entrepreneurs are ﬁnanced using new equity. This inﬂuence
of taxes on new ﬁrm creation is clearly accepted even by staunch supporters of the new view, see
Sinn (1991). It is important to notice that changes in the total capital stock mainly come from
changes in the ﬁrm number, see part 3.1. While owners of mature ﬁrms using retentions cannot
react on tax changes, potential new entrants facing a descrete decision choice can. A forward
looking entrepreneur anticipates any forthcoming tax liabilities resulting in a depression of new
ﬁrm creation and capital accumulation. The possibility to partially substitute new equity ﬁnance
by the introduction of a phase of internal growth will not be able to eliminate the general result
that the ﬁrm has to start with a new equity infusion. That is, although the tax neutrality result
of the new view holds for mature and growing ﬁrms, both taxes will have ”real” consequences
19through the creation of ﬁrms so that new equity is the macroeconomic important source of
ﬁnance.
Average and marginal tax burden When discussing capital income taxation, researchers
have typically relied on partial equilibrium models of ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial policy to derive theoretical
ﬁndings. Typical applied studies use the concept of eﬀective marginal tax rates (EMTR) de-
veloped by King and Fullerton (1984). Recently, the importance of discrete investment choices
has been recognised and has led to the development of an eﬀective average tax rate (EATR)
following Devereux and Griﬃth (1998). This important distinction is also present in this paper.
While marginal investment decisions follow the new view and thus do not react on the level of
the dividend tax, there are also discrete investment decisions in the form of the start investment
of new entrepreneurs. Since forthcoming tax liabilities are fully taken account of at this stage,
the concept of an average tax burden becomes relevant and taxes inﬂuence the outcome.
Dividend policy Poterba and Summers (1985) estimate the impact of tax changes on an
aggregate measure of payout behavior. They ﬁnd that dividends as a share of proﬁts decline
in response to higher dividend tax rates. This ﬁnding is consistent with an explicit dividend
policy as described by the old view and violates the new view’s prediction that dividends are
residual. In our model, ﬁrms follow the new view of dividend taxation and there is no signalling
through the payout ratio. While payout policy of a single ﬁrm is trivial as it either pays out
no dividends or keeps no retentions, the aggregate version of the model will respond to tax
incentives in accordance with the empirical evidence.




0 πjdj as the percentage of overall ﬁrm proﬁts
that is paid out as dividends. A mass of δN(1 − exp(−δT)) of ﬁrms are still in their growth
phase and pay no dividends. The remaining ﬁrms δN exp(−δT) have constant proﬁts that they
pay out as dividends D(T) = P(T) · K(T). For growing ﬁrms, proﬁts increase over time by the
growing capital stock. Individual ﬁrm proﬁts are given as p(s)K (s) where price setting follows
(A.3) and the capital stock is given in (9). We thus have
θ =
N exp(−δT) · p(T)K (T)
N
R T









ε (T − t)
 ε
1−ε dt + 1
Notice that absent of taxation or with identical and thus non-distortionary taxes, there would
emerge full payout of dividends [T = 0]. Firms would start with their optimal capital stock right
20from the beginning and there would be no intermediate growth phase with capital gains as an
alternative usage of proﬁts.
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The payout ratio declines with the dividend tax and increases with the capital gains tax.
Notice that this is not a single-ﬁrm eﬀect but a result of the aggregation of growing and mature
ﬁrms. Mature ﬁrms pay out all there proﬁts independent of the increase in the dividend tax,
growing ﬁrms retain all proﬁts to reach the mature capital stock. The payout ratio then depends
on the fraction of ﬁrms that are in the growth or payout phase respectively. Taxation can set
incentives to use internal funds instead of new equity and thus to increase the time of internal
growth. Given that ﬁrms have a ﬁxed average lifetime of 1
δ this implies that the payout phase
has to decline. The results can then be derived from the behavior of ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial policy in
part 3.2.1: We expect the payout ratio to decline if ﬁrms want to grow longer because of a higher
dividend tax, and we expect the payout ratio to increase if the relative advantage of retentions
declines because of an increase in the capital gains tax. The derivatives prove this view.
Tax capitalisation Both views have opposing predictions about the capitalisation of taxes.
While the old view predicts a shadow price of capital q = 1 implying no capitalisation, the new
view in its basic formulation predicts full capitalisation of dividend taxes q = 1−τ
1−c. The formal
results are also present in our model, see stage 1 and 3 of the nucleus, respectively. Using a
sample of British companies, Poterba and Summers (1985) test the two opposing predictions
and rule out the capitalisation of the new view. A variety of critics can be raised against this
approach.6 In the light of this paper, we can add an additional argument:
Unfortunately, marginal q is hard to measure in empirical studies. The estimation of Poterba
and Summers (1985) is thus based on Hayashi (1982)’s result that marginal and average Q are
identical for a competitive ﬁrm with a linear revenue function. Marginal and average Q are then
determined as the ratio of ﬁrm value over its capital stock. The identity of marginal and average
q is however not true for a model of monopolistic competition like the one used here. In this
framework, average Q will, absent taxes, exceed 1 while marginal q is 1. We will illustrate this
6See the discussion in Auerbach and Hassett (2003).
21point by only looking at mature ﬁrms which will have the lowest value of marginal q. Following
the new view of dividend taxation they have a marginal q = 1−τ
1−c. From (5) we determine ﬁrm










We see that average Q = 1−τ
1−c
1
ε is higher than marginal q and potentially even higher than
1. Measuring average q instead of marginal q, Poterba and Summers (1985) bias their results
towards an exceptance of the old view’s prediction. Obviously, this bias eﬀect is a result of
our assumption of a decreasing returns to scale production function and our argument might
therefore appear artiﬁcial.7 However, as we have emphasized in the introduction, a model with
constant returns to scale does not seem to be compatible with a diversity of ﬁrms using diﬀerent
sources of marginal investments. Especially, such a model would not allow the creation of new
ﬁrms in the presence of established ﬁrms as competitive market prices would reﬂect the low cost
of capital of mature ﬁrms.
3.5 Optimal capital income taxation
We will omit a formal analysis of optimal taxation since results are easily anticipated by com-
parision with previous work by e.g. Jones (1995). A ﬁrst and maybe most obvious ineﬃciency
introduced by taxes is the distortion in capital allocation across ﬁrms. We have already noted
that a redistribution of capital across ﬁrms would raise aggregate production. We thus follow
that optimal taxation in a decentralised setup must not allow for a growth phase and therefore
equate the taxation of dividends and capital gains. Such a rule is however not easily imple-
mented in practise. The capital gains tax that we use in the model is assumed to be an eﬀective
tax rate which will diverge form the statutory one. As the tax is only due when assetes are sold,
investors receive a tax-free deferral of payment. In practise there is a quite long list of other
startegies to reduce the eﬀective tax burden. For all positive tax parameter, a typical capital
gains tax will then fall short of the dividend tax and introduce the distortion resulting in a wel-
fare loss. Auerbach (1991) proposes a diﬀerent system of capital gains taxation that eliminates
the problems mentioned above. At the moment this ”retrospective capital gains taxation” is
only an academic proposal and not yet used in practise.
7Only recently, Abel and Eberly (2002) have reinterpreted the typical estimations of the Q-theory in the
presence of a deceasing returns to scale revenue function. They show that average Q, typically above one in value,
is correlated with the investment ratio.
22The second ineﬃciency results from using a model of monopolistic competition. In the
decentralized outcome, monopolistic ﬁrms produce at a too low scale resulting in a reduced
output. We have seen that total production declines with both tax rates so that ﬁrst best
capital income taxes are negative implying a subsidy on capital accumulation and repeating a
result of Judd (1997).
4 Conclusions
The paper has set up a general equilibrium model of ﬁrm creation and destruction that allows
for an in depth analysis of dividend and capital gains taxes in general equilibrium. The previous
literature using stylised partial equilibrium models has found it hard to yield plausible policy
implications as the analysis had to omit several important behavioral margins. The model
presented here then allows for a broader view on the problem by including a heterogeneous
distribution of ﬁrms. Arguments of both the new and the old view of dividend taxation are
incorporated so that the aggregate version shares some of the predictions of both approaches.
In contrast to other work that tried to describe likely consequences of dividend and capital gains
taxes on the macroeconomic level, the paper has a strong microstructural foundation based
on proﬁt maximising ﬁrms and does not rely on arguments other than capital income taxes in
determining the capital structure and payout behavior.
Implications of the model seem to be consistent with typical empirical ﬁndings. The microe-
conomic structure of the model is compatible with recent empirical research by Auerbach and
Hassett (2003) who emphasize the heterogeneity of marginal sources of investment across ﬁrms.
While there exist ﬁrms that use new equity issues, there are other mostly mature ﬁrms that
reduce their dividend payments in order to ﬁnance new investments. The payout ratio declines
in response to an increase in the dividend tax and increases with the capital gains tax. Firm
creation responds to changes in personal tax rates.
It turns out that both the dividend and the capital gains tax are harmful for the economic
outcome. We have determined two main channels: First, capital income taxes depress aggregate
capital accumulation. Taxes are discounted in ﬁrm values and are anticipated at the ﬁrms birth
stage. Second, a diﬀerential treatment of dividends and capital gains creates a distortion in the
capital allocation between ﬁrms thus depressing aggregate production by inducing ﬁrms to use
an intermediate growth stage. While both taxes depress production by the capitalisation eﬀect,
the dividend tax increases the distortion of capital allocation while the capital gains tax tends
to counterbalance it. An optimal tax system should equate both tax rates.
23Appendix: Firm ﬁnancial and investment decisions
Firms are assumed to maximise ﬁrm value (5) subject to the capital accumulation (6) [using a
Lagrange multiplier of qj (s)], the dividend Dj(s) ≥ 0 and new equity constraints V Nj(s) ≥ 0
[with multipliers µD (s) and µV (s) respectively] as well as a market clearing or no excess supply
condition for the market of its consumption good [λ(s)], see (3). We use the cash ﬂow constraint




[pj (s)Kj (s) − Ij (s)] −
τ − c
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pj (s) + λ(s) (A.2d)









qj (t)Kj (t) = 0 (A.2e)
We can combine (A.2a) and (A.2b) resulting in qj (s) = 1−µV . Observing (A.2c) and ruling
out trivial solutions with Kj (s) = 0, we request λ(s) > 0. This implies a price setting rule such
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(A.5)
24We can easily see by (A.2a) that dividend payment and new equity issues can never happen
together (we restrict ourselves to cases where there is a diﬀerential tax treatment of dividends
and capital gains so that at least one of µD and µV has to be positive) and can then distinguish
three distinct cases. They describe the nucleus theory as in Sinn (1991). For a more in depth
analysis, see the original paper.
1. Start-up Firm µV = 0, µD ≥ 0 and thus qj (0) = 1
This is only a momentary state of setting up the ﬁrm. Because of the cash ﬂow and capital
accumulation condition we have Ij (0) = V Nj(0) = Kj (0).
2. Growing Firm µV ≥ 0 and µD ≥ 0
Marginal source of new investments are retained earnings. There are no payouts. All free
cash ﬂow is invested in increasing the capital stock.







This is in an intermediate growth stage whose transitional behavior is given by the two
diﬀerence equations





















3. Mature Firm µV ≥ 0, µD = 0 and thus qj (T) = 1−τ
1−c
The capital stock has reached its ﬁnal stage so that there are no new investments Ij (T) = 0.


































Knowing that the capital stock and the shadow price q evolve constantly without jumps, we
can then solve the diﬀerence equations backwards, starting from the ﬁnal points of a mature
ﬁrm qj (T) = 1−τ
1−c and Kj (T) back to the setting up with qj (0) = 1. The transitional behavior
follows (A.6a) and (A.6b) and the two important unknowns are T and Kj (0).









1−ε, the closed form








































1−c where T is the time of internal growth of the ﬁrm. We can now evaluate the integral




















κ(τ,c,ε) is thus implicitly deﬁned and can be evaluated numerically. For economic reasons,











Kj (0) = κ(τ,c,ε) · Kj (T) (A.13)
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